We apply some continuous selection theorems to establish coincidence theorems for a family of multimaps under various conditions. Then we apply these coincidence theorems to study the equilibrium problem with m families of players and 2m families of constraints on strategy sets. We establish the existence theorems of equilibria of this problem and existence theorem of equilibria of abstract economics with two families of players.
Introduction
For multimaps F : X Y and S : Y X, a point (x, y) ∈ X × Y is called a coincidence point of F and S if y ∈ F(x) and x ∈ S(y). In 1937, Neumann [19] and in 1966 Fan [8] established the well-known coincidence theorems. In 1984, Browder [4] combined Kakutani-Fan fixed-point theorem and Fan-Browder fixedpoint theorem to obtain a coincidence theorem. So many authors gave some coincidence theorems and applied them in various fields as equilibrium problem, minimax theorem, quasi-variational inequalities, game theory, mathematical economics, and so on, see [1, 5, 6, 9, 11, 18] Let I and J be any index sets. For each i ∈ I and j ∈ J, let X i and Y j be nonempty sets and H j : X = i∈I X i Y j ; T i : Y = j∈J Y j X i be multimaps. A point (x,ȳ) ∈ X × Y , wherex = (x i ) i∈I andȳ = (ȳ j ) j∈J is called a coincidence point of two families of multimaps, ifȳ j ∈ H j (x) andx i ∈ T i (ȳ) for each i ∈ I and j ∈ J. In this paper, we apply the continuous selection theorem of Horvath [10] and the fixed-point theorem of Park [17] to derive the coincidence theorems for two families of multimaps. Our coincidence theorems for two families of multimaps include Fan-Browder fixed-point theorem [3] and Browder coincidence theorem [4] as special cases.
We will employ our results on coincidence theorems for two families of multimaps to consider the equilibrium problem with m families of players and 2m families of constraints on the strategy sets introduced by Lin et al. [14] . We consider the following problem: let I be any index set and for each k ∈ I, let J k be a finite index set, X kj denote the strategy set of jth player in kth family,
lk j be the payoff of the jth player in the kth family, let A kj : Y k X kj be the constraint which restricts the strategy of the jth player in the kth family to the subset A kj (Y k ) of X kj when all players in other families have chosen their strategies x i j , i ∈ I, i = k, and j ∈ J i , and let B k : Y k Y k be the constraint which restricts the strategies of all the families except kth family to the subset B k (Y k ) of Y k when all the players in the k family have chosen their strategies y k = (x kj ) j∈Jk , k ∈ I. Our problem is to find a strategies combinationȳ
, and for all k ∈ I and j ∈ J k . In the Nash equilibrium problem, the strategy of each player is subject to no constraint. In the Debreu equilibrium problem, the strategy of each player is subject to a constraint which is a function of the strategies of the other players. For the special case of our problem, if each of the families contain one player, we find that the strategy of each player is subject a constraint which is a function of strategies of the other players, and for each k ∈ I, where I is the index set of players, the strategies combination of the players other than the kth player is a function of strategy of kth player. Therefore, our problem is different from the Nash equilibrium problem and their generalizations. As we note from Remark 4.8, for each k ∈ I, if J k = {k} be a singleton set, then the above problem reduces to the problem which is different from the Debreu social equilibrium problem [6] and the Nash equilibrium problem [19] . Lin et al. [14] demonstrate the following example of this kind of equilibrium problem in our real life. Let I = {1, 2,...,m} denote the index set of the companies. For each k ∈ I, let J k = {1, 2,...,n k } denote the index set of factories in the kth company, F kj denote the payoff function of the jth factory in the kth company. We assume that the products between the factories in the same company are different, and the financial systems and management systems are independent between the factories in the same company, while some collections of products are the same and some collections of products are different between different factories in different companies. Therefore, the strategy of the jth factory in the kth company depends on the strategies of all factories in different companies. The payoff function F kj of the jth factory in the kth company depends on its strategy and the strategies of factories in other companies. We also assume that for each k ∈ I, the strategies of the k company influence the strategies of all other companies. With this strategies combination, each factory can choose a collection of products, and from these collection of products, there exists a product that minimizes the loss of each factory. In this type of abstract economic problem with two families of players, the strategy and the preference correspondence of each player in family A depend on the strategies combination of all players in family B, but does not depend on the strategies combination of the players in family A. The same situation occurs to each player of family B. The abstract economic problem studied in the literature, the strategy and preference correspondence of each player depend on the strategies combination of all the players. Therefore, the abstract economic problem, we studied in this paper, is different from the abstract economic studied in the literature. In some economic model with two companies (say A and B), the strategy of each factory of company A depend on the strategies combination of factories in company B. The same case occurs in company B. We can use this example to explain the abstract economic problem we study in this paper. We also apply the coincidence theorems for a family of multimaps to consider the abstract economic problem with two families of players. In this paper, we want to establish the existence theorems of equilibria of constrained equilibrium problems with m families of players and 2m families of constraints and existence theorem of equilibria of abstract economic with two families of players.
Preliminaries
In order to establish our main results, we first give some concepts and notations. Throughout this paper, all topological spaces are assumed to be Hausdorff. Let A be a nonempty subset of topological vector space (t.v.s.) X, we denote by intA the interior of A, byĀ the closure of A in X, by coA the convex hull of A, and bycoA the closed convex hull of A. Let X, Y , and Z be nonempty sets. A multimap (or map) T : X Y is a function from X into the power set of Y and
Let X and Y be two topological spaces, a multimap T : X Y is said to be compact if there exists a compact subset A topological space is said to be acyclic if all of its reducedĈech homology groups vanish. In particular, any convex set is acyclic. Definition 2.1 (see [15] ). Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a t.v.s. E. A multimap G : X R is said to be R + -quasiconvex if, for any α ∈ R, the set
is convex.
Definition 2.2 (see [15] ). Let Z be a real t.v.s. with a convex solid cone C and A be a nonempty subset of Z. A pointȳ ∈ A is called a weak vector minimal point of A if, for any y ∈ A, y −ȳ ∈ −int C. Moreover, the set of weak vector minimal points of A is denoted by wMin C A. 
Coincidence theorems for families of multivalued maps
Proof. Since for each i ∈ I, T i is compact, there exists a compact subset 
for all x i ∈ K i and for all i ∈ I. By assumption (iii), for all i ∈ I and for all
follows from assumption (iv) and the continuity of f that
Hence,
Then by Lemma 2.3, there exists a pointx 
Proof. Following the same argument as in the proof of [20, Theorem 1], for each i ∈ I and j ∈ J, there are two u.s.c. multimaps P j : coC D j and Q i : co D C i with nonempty closed convex values such that P j (x) ⊂ T j (x) for all x ∈ co C, and Q i (y) ⊂ H i (y) for all y ∈ co D. Define P : coC D, Q : coD C by P(x) = j∈J P j (x) for all x ∈ co C, and Q(y) = i∈I Q i (y) for all y ∈ co D. By 
Remark 3.8. (i) In particular, if I = J is a singleton, X = Y , E = V , and F = I X , the identity mapping on X in the above theorem, then we can obtain well-known Browder fixed-point theorem [3] .
(ii) If I = J is a singleton, F is an u. 
Then there existx
Remark 3.10. In Theorem 3.5, if F j is an u.s.c. multimap with nonempty closed convex values for each j ∈ J, then J may be any index set.
Let I be any index set and, for each i ∈ I, let {U i } i∈I be a family of locally convex t.v.s. For each i ∈ I, let X i be a nonempty convex subset in t.v.s. E i for each i ∈ I. Let X = i∈I X i , X i = j∈I, j =i X j and we write X = X i × X i . For each x ∈ X, x i ∈ X i denotes the ith coordinate and x i ∈ X i the projection of x onto X i , and we also write x = (x i ,x i ). 
Proof.
Define multimaps P i : X X i and P : X X by P i (x) = F i (g i (x i )) and P(x) = i∈I P i (x) for all x = (x i ) i∈I ∈ X, then P i is an u.s.c. multimap with nonempty closed acyclic values for all i ∈ I. Therefore, P : X X is also an u.s.c. multimap with nonempty closed acyclic values. Since X is a nonempty compact convex subset in a locally convex t.v.s. E = i∈I E i , it follows from [17, Theorem 7] (ii) The proofs and conditions between Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 3.11 are somewhat different.
Applications of coincidence theorem for families of multimaps to equilibrium problems
In this section, we establish the existence theorem of equilibrium problem with m families of players and 2m families of constraints on strategy sets which has been introduced by Lin et al. [14] . Let I be a finite index set and for each k ∈ I and Throughout the paper, we will use the above mentioned notations, unless otherwise specified. 
Abstract economics with two families of players
In this section, we consider the following abstract economics with two families of players.
Let I and J be any index sets and let {U i } i∈I and {V j } j∈J be families of locally convex t.v.s. For each i ∈ I and j ∈ J, let X i and Y j be nonempty convex subsets each in U i and V j , respectively. Two families of abstract economy 
With the above notation, we have the following theorem. Then all conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied. It follows from Theorem 3.1, there existx = (x i ) i∈I ∈ X andȳ = (ȳ j ) j∈J ∈ Y such thatx i ∈ T i (ȳ) andȳ j ∈ G j (x) for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J. By (v), we havex i ∈ B i (ȳ),ȳ j ∈ D j (x), A i (ȳ) ∩ P i (ȳ) = ∅, and C j (x) ∩ Q j (x) = ∅.
